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Using a unique dataset on subsidiary executive appointments in multinational banks and a 
competitive assignment matching model, this study investigates executive selection in the 
international labour market. The international context is characterised by heterogeneous firms 
with varied human capital needs, allowing for a nuanced examination of the determinants of 
executive selection along multiple human capital dimensions, with a particular emphasis on firm-
specific versus general human capital. The study explores (i) the determinants of executive 
selection in MNC subsidiaries, (ii) how these determinants shift relative to economic conditions, 
and (iii) how they differ for two types of functional roles. I find that the relationship between 
human capital and the firm's resource base is largely complementary; however, firm-specific 
human capital is the dominant determinant of executive selection during an economic upswing, 
but during an economic downturn firm-specific human capital is nearly four times weaker in 
driving selection than general human capital. 
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An important question for managers and management scholars alike is how firms select the right 
workers. As a production input, human capital has an unrivalled impact on firm performance. 
However, finding the right fit between workers and firms is non-trivial. Not only do human 
capital attributes differ between individuals, but the value of human capital can differ 
dramatically between firms (Lazear and Oyer, 2012; Campbell et al., 2012). In other words, the 
value of a worker to a firm depends not only on his or her abilities but also on the quality of the 
match between the firm and the worker’s human capital attributes. 
 
 
  This paper is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled ‘Estimating the determinants of executive--
subsidiary matches’ presented at the ‘Strategic Management Society’ Berlin, Germany, 20 September 2016. 
Despite the importance of job matching and despite its ubiquity in organisational life, the 
personnel economics literature and the literature on strategic human capital continue to debate 
how the matching process takes place. What are the determinants of a job match? Which 
mechanisms underlie the matching process? In particular, it is unclear whether an efficient job 
match arises from aligning firm attributes to idiosyncratic combinations of general human 
capital, to on-the-job firm-specific experience, or whether it arises from a mix of both (Lazear, 
2009). Finally, how do matching patterns change between economic upswings and downturns, 
and are they consistent between functional roles? 
 
To inform research on selection and matching, I examined the international labour market and 
executive selection processes in multinational corporations’ (MNCs) foreign subsidiaries. The 
international context is comprised of heterogeneous firms with varied human capital needs, and 
provides a rich research setting for studying the determinants of executive–firm matches. Using a 
competitive assignment matching model, I estimated the drivers of efficient job matching by 
modelling how executives with different skillsets partner with MNC subsidiaries, and examined 
how the joint preferences of executives and firms change depending on economic conditions. 
 
By applying the logic of a two-sided competitive assignment game (Shapley and Shubik, 1971) 
to the process of executive selection, my study addresses a limitation of previous research. The 
assignment of executives to firms is endogenously determined, meaning that both executives and 
firms choose their partners strategically and interdependently given rival options in the labour 
market. Since executive selection by firms is (i) non-random and is (ii) likely to be influenced by 
unobservable variables, using classical regression frameworks is problematic and can lead to 
biased results (Chatain and Mindruta, 2017). One such unobservable variable, which is arguably 
a key component of the executive selection process, is the availability of human capital in the 
labour market, and its exclusion can bias the results obtained using regression models. 
 
The two-sided matching approach compares observed executive–firm matches relative to all 
other counterfactual matches that could have occurred in the labour market, but did not. This 
method thereby explicitly accounts for the availability of human capital in the labour market. 
The counterfactual partnerships between executives and firms represent the set of relevant 
potential candidates available to firms in the labour market and, conversely, the set of employers 
seeking to fill executive positions. The empirical estimation strategy uses the assumption that the 
labour market is in a pairwise stable equilibrium where neither executives nor firms would gain 
from forming a counterfactual match. I exploited the constraint that observed matches produce 
higher productivity for both partners than any possible counterfactual executive–firm pairing to 
estimate the parameters of interest. Solving a matching model with many agents is not trivial 
because the observed solution must hold compared against all possible counterfactual 
partnerships, otherwise an agent would have incentive to deviate from his or her equilibrium 
match. Following Fox (2010b), I used a maximum score estimation strategy to estimate a local 
production maximisation condition, and optimised the multinomial model using the differential 
evolution method. 
 
I applied this method to a self-collected database of 2063 matches between MNC subsidiaries 
and top management team executives, of which 1068 have complete information on all firm and 
executive attributes of interest. The study sample included 75 subsidiaries of 33 US and 
European banks located in 12 Central & Eastern European countries during 2005–2010. 
 
In addition to highlighting the determinants of an executive–subsidiary job match, I studied the 
relative weights that various types of MNCs place on firm-specific human capital versus 
different kinds of general human capital. Because general human capital can itself differ in its 
“generality”, I examined how MNCs weigh firm-specific human capital relative to the following 
types of general human capital: education, international experience, relevant regional experience, 
and relevant country-specific experience, listed here from most general to more specific. Finally, 
I examined how the determinants of a job match change between periods of economic growth 
and economic decline. This study contributes to human capital theory (Becker, 1964) and 
research on strategic human capital (Campbell et al., 2012). The results lend empirical support to 
the strategic human capital view, which argues that firms benefit from both firm-specific and 
general human capital; however, the use value of general human capital varies with the goodness 
of fit between firm resources and workers’ idiosyncratic endowment of widely-applicable skills 
(Campbell et al., 2012). 
 
2 Theoretical background 
 
The intuitive notion of “fit” is a central premise for understanding strategic decision making 
within organisations (Venkatraman, 1989; Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). Since the seminal works 
of Chandler (1962) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), who first articulated that organisational 
efficiency arises from alignment between firm strategy, structure, and managerial processes, 
management researchers have explored “fit” from many angles. Defining and testing for fit 
within complex, interrelated systems however can be an empirical challenge (Schoonhoven, 
1981; Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985). 
 
An approach which has been lauded by scholars for correspondence between the theoretical 
concept and its formal, mathematical formulation is to define fit through matching between 
related variables (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995; Venkatraman, 1989). The mathematical concepts 
that underlie a matching approach are complementarity and substitutability. Formally, two 
variables are complements in production if the cross-partial derivative of the objective function 
with respect to the two inputs is positive, and substitutes if the cross-partial derivate is negative. 
An advantage of this optimization approach is that fit can be determined without referencing an 
outcome variable, such as system performance. Instead, total productivity is measured as the 
weighted sum of estimated complementarities among a system of relationships. 
 
The matching approach has been used to study two-sided markets where the strategic aspects of 
partner choice drive the match. Unlike random utility models, which rely on random assignment 
and independence, matching models explicitly account for voluntary, intentional, joint selection 
by partners under conditions of rivalry which are based on strategic considerations, such as an 
expectation of mutual gain (Mortensen, 1988). The assumption of complementarity and 
assortative matching on quality underlies much of the literature on matching in two-sided 
markets and has been used to model the formation of marriage partnerships (Becker, 1973), 
investor-firm partnerships (Sorensen, 2007), strategic research alliances (Mindruta, 2013; 
Mindruta et al., 2016), brand alliances (Yang et al., 2009), sponsorships (Yang and Goldfarb, 
2015), as well as job matching in labour markets (Jovanovic, 1979). 
 
The literature on matching in the executive labour market has largely focused on explaining the 
distribution of executive pay. Observed empirical outcomes in studies of executive–firm matches 
show sorting based on executive pay relative to firm size (Rosen, 1982; Gabaix and Landier, 
2008) which is interpreted as evidence of a strong positive relationship between firm resources 
and managerial talent (Tervio, 2008). Edmans et al. (2009) expanded the matching model of firm 
size and executive pay to add executive risk aversion. However, few scholars have exploited the 
methodology to explore the multidimensional nature of match formation and address executive–
firm fit. Exceptions include the recent work of Pan (2017), who observes complementarities on 
multiple attributes between executives and firms, and finds evidence of assortative matching on 
(i) firm size and executive talent, (ii) firm diversification and executive experience in 
conglomerates, and (iii) firm R&D intensity and executive technical experience. 
 
This study matched executives and MNC subsidiaries along multiple dimensions to estimate 
which firm characteristics and human capital attributes jointly determine executive selection. 
Specifically, I explored whether the same mechanism – complementarity or substitutability – 
underlie executive–firm matching for both firm-specific attributes and general attributes. My 
study responds to a recent call for scholars to specify if human capital is a complementary 
resource, whether it acts a substitute to other firm resources, or whether it is neither (Mackey et 
al., 2014). The model has precise implications for the importance of firm-specific versus general 
human capital relative to firm characteristics and contributes to human capital theory by 
informing our understanding of executive–firm fit. 
 
This research builds on current themes in the literature on strategic human capital, namely the 
recent reconceptualisation of general human capital as having firm-specific value. Traditional 
human capital theory (Becker, 1964) asserts that firms cannot enjoy competitive advantage from 
general human capital, because general skills are widely deployable. However, Campbell et al. 
(2012) argue that general human capital has the potential to be a source of competitive advantage 
for a firm if its use value at the focal firm is greater than at other firms in the market. In other 
words, they propose that the value of general human capital is not constant across firms. Instead, 
its value varies depending on how it fits with a firm’s resources and strategic positioning. 
 
Lazear (2009) offers a related observation and employs formal mathematical modelling to show 
that because firms’ needs are unique, firms weigh general skills differently. Although on its own 
each general skill is not firm-specific, unique combinations of general human capital are. The 
implication of this is that idiosyncratic combinations of general human capital can be a source of 
value for both firms (as measured by firm performance) and workers (in terms of wage growth). 
Numerous empirical studies find support for this view and report greater returns to general 
human capital than to firm-specific human capital, when general human capital is proxied by 
occupational tenure (Gathmann and Schonberg, 2010; Lazear and Oyer, 2004; Dobbie et al., 
2014; Sullivan, 2010; Nawakitphaitoon, 2014) or industry tenure (Neal, 1995; Parent, 2000). The 
presented study builds on this work, but instead of focusing on general and firm-specific human 
capital as determinants of earnings, I estimated multidimensional fit between firm and executive 
human capital attributes during the selection process. 
 
This study also incorporates work on the role of industry conditions on firms’ preferences for 
executive human capital. How firm performance impacts turnover has been studied extensively 
(Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2003; Ocasio, 1999; Dalton and Kesner, 
1985; Guthrie and Datta, 1998), but recently scholars have turned their attention to examining 
how changes in environmental conditions alter demand for human capital attributes (Eisfeldt and 
Kuhnen, 2013; Jenter and Kanaan, 2015). I contribute to this growing literature by studying how 
complementarities between firm and executive attributes differ during an economic upturn 




Doing business in multiple countries exposes MNCs to a broad range of markets, technologies, 
and information. MNCs can then deploy this acquired knowledge in the management of their 
overseas subsidiaries and use it to compete against local rivals (Kogut, 1989; Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 2004). Much of the acquired knowledge is tacit and requires human capital to 
successfully transfer it within firm boundaries (Hymer, 1976; Buckley and Casson, 1976; Caves, 
1996; Teece, 1981; Kogut and Zander, 1993). As a result, executive human capital is 
fundamental to effectively manage multinational operations. However, executive–firm fit 
remains underexplored in the international context. 
 
MNCs with numerous, globally dispersed subsidiaries use executives to manage knowledge 
flows within firm boundaries. Top-down knowledge transfer from the parent company to its 
subsidiaries is essential, because headquarters are sources of both managerial and technical 
know-how. However, subsidiary management must be able to address frictions arising from 
cross-country differences in cultures, systems and institutions, and satisfy the needs of local 
customers. Therefore, the human capital needs of multinational corporations are quite complex, 
which is why the foreign subsidiary setting is useful for the study of joint, multidimensional 
preferences of executives and firms. 
 
Value creation from matching between partners arises out of alignment. Alignment can be driven 
by (i) complementarity and positive sorting on attributes, or (ii) it can emerge out of a 
substitution effect where one partner contributes what the other lacks and partnerships are 
created according to negative sorting on attributes. 
 
In this study, I focus on the several fundamental relationships between firm and executive 
characteristics, some of which have already been examined in the literature using regression-
based methods, while others are breaking new ground. The seven hypothesised relationships are 
as follows: 
 
1. A subsidiary executive’s educational attainment is complementary to the size of the MNC. 
2. A subsidiary executive’s international experience is complementary to the scope of the 
MNC’s international operations. 
3. A subsidiary executive’s relevant regional experience is complementary to the MNC’s 
regional presence in Central & Eastern Europe. 
4. A local subsidiary executive (a subsidiary-country national) is complementary to 
subsidiary age. 
5. A subsidiary executive’s tenure with the MNC is complementary to the subsidiary being 
an acquisition. 
6. The joint preferences of MNCs and executives along the above-mentioned attributes will 
shift in response to an economic discontinuity. 
7. The joint preferences of MNCs and executives along the above-mentioned attributes will 
differ for monitoring-oriented and implementation-oriented functional roles. 
 
In the following paragraphs, I provide a description of the above-listed relationships in more 
detail. 
 
3.1 MNC size and executive educational attainment (general human capital) 
 
Previous studies of executive–firm fit show a complementary relationship between firm size and 
managerial talent (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Tervio, 2008; Bandiera et al., 2015), arguing that 
resource-rich firms can attract and compensate better-qualified managers and in turn, qualified 
managers want to work for firms where there is more to manage. I began my examination of 
mutual relationships between subsidiary–executive pairings by considering MNC size and 
general human capital in its most basic form – executive’s education. It follows from the 
resource argument that larger MNCs (which are more complex to manage) can attract more 
qualified candidates (Berry et al., 2006). A common signal of an executive’s qualification is his 
or her education level (Rose and Shepard, 1997; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). More highly 
educated executives are attracted to larger MNCs, because they arguably offer a more prestigious 
position and higher compensation. Indeed, research indicates that managers of MNC that are 
larger and more internationally-diversified earn a higher wage premium (Black et al., 2014). 
Therefore, I proposed to test a relationship between organisational economies of scale and 
general human capital from education. Specifically: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A subsidiary executive’s educational attainment is complementary to the 
size of the MNC. 
 
3.2 Scope of international operations and executive international experience (general human 
capital) 
 
Next, I considered the relationship between general human capital and organizational economies 
of scope. In MNCs, it is reasonable to measure scope in terms of the breadth of international 
operations. Forms of general human capital, which are particularly salient for MNCs, are 
executive international experience, regional experience, and national experience. MNCs with a 
more global footprint have access to executives with more international experience and also have 
demand for their skills (Greve et al., 2009). Individuals with previous international experience 
possess a unique competence to interact across cultures, and are effective boundary spanners 
(Yagi and Kleinberg, 2011) with a heightened capacity for solving complex problems 
(Fitzsimmons et al., 2011), making them attractive candidates for internationally diversified 
corporations. Similarly, individuals with previous international experience are attracted to global 
companies. Therefore, I proposed that executive–firm pairings will form based on 
complementarity between executives’ international experience and international scope of 
operations. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A subsidiary executive’s international experience is complementary to the 
scope of the MNC’s international operations. 
 
3.3 MNC regional presence and executive regional experience (general human capital) 
 
Similarly, I expected to find complementarity between executives’ relevant regional experience 
and the extent to which MNC operations are concentrated in the region. Executives who possess 
relevant regional experience are likely to be attractive for regionally-oriented MNCs, because 
they have expertise and know-how that is highly contextual and relevant (Argote and Miron-
Spektor, 2011; Doz et al., 2001; Torres and Augusto, 2017). Executives with experience in the 
region understand the underlying sociocultural, economic, and political environment (Johnson 
and Duxbury, 2010). This is particularly important in the Central & Eastern European (CEE) 
region (which serves as the research context), as CEE countries are characterised by comparable 
levels of economic development, parallel political histories and challenges, similar cultural 
backgrounds, and demographics. Therefore, regional expertise can be expected to add value for 
MNCs with a CEE orientation. 
 
Hypothesis 3: A subsidiary executive’s relevant regional experience is complementary to 
the MNC’s regional presence in Central & Eastern Europe. 
 
3.4 Subsidiary age and executive nationality (general human capital) 
 
The final type of general human capital I explored is national experience in the subsidiary 
country relative to subsidiary age. Previous regression-based studies show that as the subsidiary 
ages, headquarters’ basis for control shifts as does the role of the subsidiary, resulting in 
decreased reliance on expatriates and greater utilisation of local executives (Gong, 2003). With 
time, the subsidiary becomes more integrated with the rest of the MNC, and is no longer as 
dependent on the parent company for supplying basic resources, such as capital, technology, and 
knowledge (Prahalad and Doz, 1981). Subsidiaries’ talent and knowledge that had been built up 
by the MNC can be exploited through management localisation to local human resources who 
know the market and the customers well (Wang et al., 2004; Lam and Yeung, 2010; Bartlett and 
Yoshihara, 1988). I expected the following relationship: 
 
Hypothesis 4: A local subsidiary executive (a subsidiary-country national) is 
complementary to subsidiary age. 
 
3.5 Subsidiary acquisition status and executive MNC tenure (firm-specific human capital) 
 
I then examined the relationship between subsidiary acquisition status and MNC preference for 
firm-specific human capital. The knowledge base of acquired subsidiaries can be weak, 
particularly in transition economies and developing countries (Lyles and Salk, 1996). Firm-
specific human capital is likely to be important during the integration of a foreign acquisition 
into the MNC, as firms transfer technological and management know-how (Franko, 1973; Tung, 
1982; Tung, 1987). 
 
Hypothesis 5: A subsidiary executive’s tenure with the MNC is complementary to the 
subsidiary being an acquisition. 
 
3.6 Estimating the impact of economic discontinuity on executive–firm preferences 
 
In a multidimensional competitive assignment model, parameters of the above-described 
hypothesised relationships are determined simultaneously. Therefore, it is possible to compare 
the weights that MNCs place on executives’ firm-specific knowledge relative to the four types of 
general knowledge (education, international experience, regional experience, and national 
experience) during the selection process. 
 
I modelled the above-listed relationships in two states of the world: during an economic upswing 
(2005–2007) and during an economic downturn (2008–2010). A shift in economic conditions 
changes firms’ skill demands, and the quality of existing executive–firm matches deteriorates 
(Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 2013). Therefore, I expected to observe a difference in magnitudes on the 
relative weights that firms place on general knowledge relative to firm-specific knowledge 
during good economic times versus bad, which led to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6: The joint preferences of MNCs and executives along the above-mentioned 
attributes will shift in response to an economic discontinuity. 
 
The above-written hypothesis is verifiable; however, it is purposely formulated in broad terms. 
Not only have economic conditions been unexplored by scholars as impacting firms’ relative 
preferences for firm-specific versus general human capital, but there also remains a lack of 
consensus in the theoretical and empirical literature on a more basic issue – which is, whether the 
formation of the job match is driven by firm preference for firm-specific human capital or 
general human capital in the first place. By testing Hypothesis 6, (i) I inform our understanding 
of firm behaviour in attracting firm-specific versus general human capital to executive positions, 
and (ii) by comparing the joint preferences of executives and firms in two distinct economic 
environments, I provide evidence of how these preferences can shift relative to economic 
conditions. 
 
3.7 Estimating executive–firm preferences for two types of functional roles 
 
Finally, I expected to observe a difference in firms’ skill-weights for different functional roles. In 
the functional role literature, there are two broad distinctions among functional roles based on 
their job descriptions and delegation of responsibilities (for a review of the functional role 
literature, see Menz, 2012). In particular, among the individual functional roles, there appears to 
be a difference in emphasis and amount of time spent on (i) control and oversight versus (ii) 
implementation. 
 
In general, the tasks of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Deputy CEO, and Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) involve strategy making and subsequent monitoring of organisational progress, 
require communicating with external stakeholders, and are oriented toward the long-term 
(Hambrick and Cannella, 2004). For example, the CFO function is defined as having “critical say 
in key strategic and operational decisions, from evaluating business unit performance, inventing 
new ways to leverage capital, […], to serving as the company’s primary ambassador to investors 
and financial analysts” (Zorn, 2004). From the definition, it is clear that CFOs are considered 
agents of control and oversight. 
 
In contrast, implementation roles, such as those of the Chief Operating Officer (COO), Chief 
Marketing Officer (CMO), or Chief Legal Officer (CLO) are tasked with short-term strategy 
execution and their responsibilities involve resolving operating matters internal to the firm 
(Hambrick and Cannella, 2004). The COO “is typically the key individual responsible for 
delivery of results day-to-day, quarter-to-quarter” (Bennett and Miles, 2006). Similarly, the 
responsibilities of CMOs and CLOs are to enact and support the strategies created by the CEO 
and monitored by the CFO. Therefore, these types of roles broadly emphasise implementation 
over monitoring and control. 
 
The distinction between responsibilities related to monitoring and implementation roles can be 
expected to influence the determinants of executive–firm fit, which leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 7: The joint preferences of MNCs and executives along the above-mentioned 
attributes will differ for monitoring-oriented1 and implementation-oriented2 functional 
roles. 
 
4 Empirical setting 
 
4.1 Industry setting 
 
I analysed complementarities between firm-specific and general executive human capital and 
MNC and subsidiary characteristics in the context of national subsidiaries of US and Western 
European multinational banks, located in Central & Eastern Europe. The context is characterised 
by heterogeneous firms with varied human capital needs, and the timeframe allows for an 
examination of how MNCs’ human capital preferences shifted during the business cycle, and 
how they differed among functional roles. 
 
Prior to the transition from centrally-planned economies to market economies in 1989/1990, the 
financial sector in Central & Eastern Europe was undeveloped. CEE countries operated largely 
as cash economies. The fall of the Iron Curtain changed the industry, requiring the inflow of 
financial expertise, technological infrastructure, and managerial experience from western 
countries. The CEE financial sector drew investors mainly from Western Europe and to a lesser 
extent from the United States, and today these “western” MNCs control the majority of the 
financial institutions in this market. 
 
1 Monitoring-oriented functional roles included Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Deputy CEO, and Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO). 
2 Implementation-oriented functional roles included Chief Operating Officer (COO), legal executives, and sales 
executives. 
 
This is not to say that banking institutions did not exist in Central & Eastern Europe prior to 
1990. On the contrary, each CEE country had firmly established state-owned banks that were 
monopolists in a sub-industry, such as retail banking, corporate banking, or import/export 
financing. These state-owned monopolists enjoyed nearly 100% market share in their segment. 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, Central and Eastern European state-owned banks became 
attractive acquisition targets for Western multinationals – such as France’s Société Générale, 
Austria’s Erste Group and Raiffeisenbank, or Italy’s Unicredit – and from a financial standpoint, 
these acquisitions were exceptionally lucrative. However, integrating national subsidiaries into 
the international network was not without its challenges. New owners needed to transfer know-
how and make substantial technological investments in order to bring the CEE subsidiaries up to 
Western standards. 
 
However, the acquiring firms also inherited dense branch networks and a loyal clientele, who 
demanded a localised strategy and financial products in local currencies that were calibrated to 
local economic and institutional conditions. Not all MNCs entered the CEE market via 
acquisition, however. Banking groups such as Citibank, BNP Paribas, or HSBC developed 
greenfield operations and established a market presence by generating new business or attracting 
retail and corporate customers from the former monopolists. 
 
Following years of healthy growth and development, the global financial industry experienced a 
crisis in 2008, which created economic disturbances in many countries including the CEE region. 
A shift in economic conditions reduced the quality of executive–firm fit, and changed firms’ 
demand preferences for executive characteristics, prompting executive turnover (Eisfeldt and 
Kuhnen, 2013). In my model, I used the global financial crisis to determine how fit differs during 
economic upswings versus downturns. Specifically, I explored whether different economic 
conditions shifted how firms valued firm-specific and general human capital relative to MNC 
and subsidiary attributes. 
 
4.2 Data sample 
 
To study executive–firm fit, I used panel data on executive appointments to wholly-owned 
subsidiaries of multinational banks during the six-year period from 2005–2010. The unit of 
analysis is the executive–subsidiary pair and the analysis was based on 2063 observed job 
matches. I included both new hires and continuing appointments in the analysis, because I 
considered the choice to reappoint an executive in the following year as affirmation of 
executive–subsidiary fit by both partners. Subsidiary executives were defined as individuals who 
belong to the executive committee, as self-reported by the subsidiaries in their annual reports 
and/or company web pages. The study sample included 75 subsidiaries of 33 US and European 
banks from 15 different countries, located in 12 Central and Eastern European countries. Of the 
1068 matching records with complete information on executive and firm attributes, 473 
matching records were observed in the 2005–2007 period and 595 were observed in 2008–2010. 
433 records were of executives in monitoring roles, while 486 records represented executives in 
implementation roles, and the remaining 149 records did not clearly fit either functional role 
category. 
 
The data were collected from subsidiaries providing retail, private and/or commercial banking 
services, and came from subsidiary annual reports, MNC annual reports, LinkedIn, and the Orbis 
Bank Focus Database. Information on appointed subsidiary executives and their human capital 
attributes were obtained from top management team biographies as presented in subsidiary-level 
annual reports. The information provided in these biographies was supplemented by educational 
and experiential histories available through LinkedIn. Subsidiary-level characteristics of 
subsidiary age and acquisition status came from the Orbis Bank Focus database, as did the 
information on MNC size. The international scope of MNC operations and the extent of its 
regional focus were sourced from MNCs’ annual reports. 
 
Table 1. Study sample details 
List of MNC 
home countries 
List of subsidiary 




























Allied Irish Banks Group 
Alpha Bank 
BNP Paribas 















Hypo Group Alpe Adria 
Intesa Sanpaolo 
KBC Group 
MDM Bank Group 












4.3 Definitions of variables 
 
4.3.1 Executive information 
 
For each executive, I obtained five types of information: educational attainment, international 
experience, regional experience, nationality, and MNC tenure. 
 
Educational attainment is a categorical variable, where 
 
Educational attainment = 0 for no college degree 
 = 1 for bachelor’s degree 
 = 2 for master’s degree 
 = 3 for Ph.D. degree. 
 
International experience is a continuous variable with zero as its minimum possible value. It is 
the sum of cultural distances3 between all possible pairs of countries where the executive has 
gained national, educational, or work experience, and captures diversity of international 
experiences. Unlike a simple count of unique national experiences, this measure incorporates a 
notion of “hardship” associated with adapting to a different national culture. For example, 
working in the United States and Canada represents two unique national experiences, but the 
need for cultural adaptation between United States and Canada is considered less than, for 
example, between the United States and Romania. By summing cultural distances between pairs 
of countries where the executive has gained experience, I captured the individual’s experience 
level in integrating disparate national experiences. More formally, 
 




where k, l reference pairs of countries within the country set C of the executive’s past national, 
educational, or professional experiences. 
 
Regional experience is a binary variable, where 
Regional experience = 1 if the executive has national, educational, or 
work experience in the CEE region 
 = 0 otherwise. 
 
National experience is a binary variable, where 
National experience = 1 if the executive’s nationality country matches the 
subsidiary country 
 = 0 otherwise. 
 
Firm-specific experience is measured as the executive’s tenure in years with the MNC. 
 
4.3.2 Firm information 
 
For each subsidiary in the sample, the data contain the parent company’s size, scope of 
international operations, regional presence, and information on the subsidiary’s age and 
acquisition status. 
 
MNC size is the MNC’s total global assets measured in US dollars, in a given year. 
 
Scope of MNC international operations is measured as the number of countries globally where 
the MNC is present, in a given year. 
 
MNC regional presence is measured as the proportion of the number of countries in Central & 
Eastern Europe where the MNC operates through wholly-owned subsidiaries relative to the 
 
3 Cultural distance is a multi-dimensional measure which integrates power distance (respect for authority), 
uncertainty avoidance (interpersonal trust), individualism (independence and role of government), and masculinity 
(importance of family and work) as measured in the World Values Survey. 
number of countries globally where the MNC is present, in a given year. It is a proxy for the 
significance of the CEE region relative to the overall breadth of global MNC operations. 
 
Subsidiary age denotes the number of years since the parent company has acquired the 
subsidiary or established greenfield operations in the subsidiary country. 
 
Subsidiary is an acquisition is a binary variable, which is set equal to 1 if the subsidiary was 
established through acquisition, and is set to 0 if it was developed as a greenfield. 
 
5 The two-sided matching model 
 
Job assignments are voluntary, strategic pairings between firms and individuals made under 
competitive conditions, which is why it is intuitive to think of these relationships using the 
equilibrium framework of a two-sided matching model. Agents form matches along multiple 
dimensions with an expectation of mutual gain. Both firms and individuals comprise 
heterogeneous, indivisible bundles of traits for which no separate markets exist (Mortensen, 
1988). Partner choice is driven by agents’ preferences but the choice set is constrained by the 
decisions of other market actors. The equilibrium condition that underlies the framework relies 
on the plausible assumption that executives and firms choose their best available matches. In 
equilibrium, no executive–firm pair wishes to deviate from its existing match and form a new 
match. 
 
In my model, the market is characterised by two finite, disjoint sets of agents: MNC subsidiaries 
S = {s1, s2, …, si} and executives E = {e1, e2, …, ej}. I assumed search is costless and both 
executives and firms are aware of potential partners. Each firm can hire multiple executives, but 
each executive works for only one firm. 
 
5.1 Local production maximisation 
 
To formally define equilibrium, I employed the local production maximisation condition 
developed by Fox (2010a), where “production” represents the joint value of the executive–firm 
match. The production function f(sm, en) denotes the match-specific productivity of a pairing 
between attributes of subsidiary sm and executive en. It is formally defined as: 
 
f(sm, en) = ∆V(sm, en) + ∆U(sm, en), (1) 
 
where Δ V(sm, en) is the value that executive n adds to subsidiary m and Δ U(sm, en) is the value 
that subsidiary m provides to executive n. Although endogenous transfers are taking place to 
clear the market, I did not observe how match participants divide rents generated by the realised 
match. Consequently, I could not separately identify match preferences for individuals and firms 
– nor is that the goal of this study. Instead, I exploited the assumption that the joint productivity 
of realised matches exceeds the joint productivity of every possible counterfactual match that did 
not occur. By comparing realised matches between executives and firms against possible 
counterfactual matches, I determined which interactions between firm and executive attributes 
drive match productivity, and estimated the relative importance of particular complementarities. 
 
5.2 Production function specification 
 
I defined the match value (shown in general form in equation (1)) as a function of five 
interactions between firm and executive attributes. The interaction terms capture the match 
specificity in productivity, as follows: 
 
f(sm, en) = 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆1𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸1𝑛𝑛 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆2𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸2𝑛𝑛 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆3𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸3𝑛𝑛 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆4𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸4𝑛𝑛 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑆𝑆5𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸5𝑛𝑛 + 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 , (2) 
 
where sm = (S1m, S2m, S3m, S4m, S5m) are vectors of firm attributes (MNC-level and 
subsidiary-level) and en = (E1n, E2n, E3n, E4n, E5n) are vectors of executive characteristics. 
 
S1m is MNC size, E1n is executive educational attainment. 
S2m is the MNC’s scope of international operations, E2n is executive international 
experience. 
S3m is the MNC’s regional presence in CEE, E3n is executive regional experience in CEE. 
S4m is subsidiary age, E4n is executive nationality. 
S5m is the subsidiary’s acquisition status, E5n is executive tenure in the MNC. 
 
Control variables (such as executive or firm fixed effects) which would enter the 
production function as non-interactive terms could contribute to match productivity. 
However, non-interactive terms enter into the objective function on both sides of the 
inequality, are differenced out, and therefore remain unidentified. 
 
5.3 Maximum score function 
 
Suppose we have two subsidiaries, s1 and s2, and two executives, e1 and e2, and we observe 
realised pairs (s1, e1) and (s2, e2). The local production maximisation condition states that a match 
is pairwise stable if neither the firm nor the executive wishes to exchange partners. Formally, the 
following is assumed to hold true and underlies the solution concept: 
 
f(s1, e1) + f(s2, e2) ≥ f(s1, e2) + f(s2, e1) (3) 
 
This means that the sum of match-specific productivities of two realised matches {(s1, e1), (s2, 
e2)} must be greater than the sum of match-specific productivities of counterfactual matches {(s1, 
e2), (s2, e1)}. 
 
I invoked the local production maximisation condition for all combinations of two realised 
executive–firm pairs and their counterfactual pairings, setting up a system of inequalities. I then 
applied maximum score estimation (Manski, 1975) where the objective is to maximise the total 
number of inequalities (3) which are satisfied in the system. The maximum score function is a 
consistent, semi-parametric estimator that requires the production function to be specified, but 
makes no assumptions about the distribution of the error terms. This study used information on 
observed executive selection without including transfer data on compensation, which is sufficient 
for implementing the multinomial maximum score estimator. For a proof of set identification and 
consistency for maximum score estimators in a two-sided matching game without transfers, see 
Fox (2010b). In the case of executive–firm matching without transfer data, the objective function 
Q can be written as: 
 




where {a,b,i,j} is a realised quartet of two matched executive–firm pairs in the observed market 
x. Function 1[.] is the indicator function that is equal to 1 when the inequality in the bracket is 
true. The maximum score estimator can be any production function f whose parameters 
maximise the score function Q(f). For this study, the maximum score estimator serves to identify 
parameters β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5 (see equation 2), which maximise the objective function 
(equation 4) in terms of the production function specified in equation (2): 
 






In this section, I describe the estimation procedure. 
 
Step 1: Construct variables. Transform variables defined in section 4.3 in terms of each 
variable’s cumulative distribution function (CDF) to reflect the ranks of player attributes on both 
sides of the market. 
 
Step 2: Define markets. Separate the full sample of observed executive–subsidiary pairs and their 
attributes into groups by functional role (monitoring-oriented functional role and 
implementation-oriented functional role) and by year. Executives in the same functional role 
category during the same year are considered at risk of being appointed to subsidiary sm in a 
given year. 
 
Step 3: Generate interaction terms for observed executive–subsidiary matches. Multiply each 
transformed variable from the vector of firm attributes sm with its hypothesized counterpart 
variable from the vector of executive attributes en. 
 
Step 4: Construct exchange pairs. In each market, create an exhaustive list of all possible 
executive–subsidiary dyads. A dyad consists of two executives e1 and e2 and two subsidiaries s1 
and s2, where {(s1, e1), (s2, e2)} are the two realised matches, and {(s1, e2), (s2, e1)} are their 
respective counterfactual matches. For each realised and counterfactual pair, the dataset contains 
attribute variables and the interaction terms calculated in Step 3. 
 
Step 5: Generate interaction terms for counterfactual executive–subsidiary matches. For the 
counterfactual pairs {(s1, e2), (s2, e1)}, multiply variables from executive e1’s vector of attributes 
with variables from the counterfactual subsidiary s2’s vector of attributes. Then multiply 
executive e2’s vector of attributes with the attributes of the counterfactual subsidiary s1. 
 
Step 6: Invoke the differential evolution method. Perform a search algorithm using the 
differential evolution method to identify parameters β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5 (see equations (5) and 
(2)), which maximise the objective function Q(f) given in equation (4). Calculate confidence 
intervals for parameter point estimates using a sub-sampling procedure. 
 
6.2 Differential evolution method 
 
The objective function described in equation (4) was optimised using the differential evolution 
algorithm for global optimisation (Storn and Price, 1997). An implementation of this algorithm 
exists within the statistical programming environment R in the form of a well-validated and cited 
toolkit “DEoptim”. The objective function of the maximum score estimator is a step function and 
therefore many local optima may exist in the solution set. The differential evolution (DE) 
approach is well suited for the optimization problem at hand, as it does not require continuity or 
differentiability of the optimization function. As opposed to “hill-climbing”, it combines and 
alternates between local search (evolutionary selection of candidate solutions) and distant search 
(mutation-based alteration of candidate solutions) to explore the solution space, and converge 
upon a global optimum. 
 
The DEoptim toolkit is a set of general-purpose optimisation algorithms, consisting of multiple 
variants on the optimisation method. The exact behaviour of the program can be controlled by a 
number of parameters. After careful analysis of available options during which I experimented 
with step iteration sizes, optimisation strategies, and iteration counts, I ran the final optimisation 
processes within the empirically determined (“lower”, “upper”) coefficient limits on my 
parameters of interest β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5 of (–5,5), with population size of 80 evolving 
solutions, and cross-over probability of 90% (CR = 0.9). I completed 10,000 iterations for each 
process, which invariably yielded convergence. Using Windows 8-64 operating system, 8-core i7 
3.4 GHz CPU, and 12 GB of RAM, each individual optimisation process (10,000 iterations) 
required about 4 hours of CPU time to complete. 
 
Because maximum score estimation does not assume any particular distribution of error terms, I 
repeated the optimisation procedure using subsampling techniques in order to determine 
confidence intervals for individual solutions. I used a “leave 10% out” subsampling strategy 10 
times by randomly selecting 90% of the dyads in the dataset. The left-out 10% subsets were non-
intersecting. The initial population of candidate solutions is always determined randomly, and 
therefore no two repeated runs give identical results. As a consequence, the presented point 




The identification strategy which underlies the matching method in this study depends on the 
assumption that the labour market is in a pairwise stable equilibrium where neither executives 
nor firms which are currently matched would gain from forming a counterfactual match. By 
observing active players in the market and their attributes, the matching method quantifies firms’ 
preferences in the context of limited human capital availability. However, because the observed 
executive–subsidiary pairings do not represent the universe of executive appointments to MNC 
subsidiaries, my model is missing some subset of possible jobs that actually are in a given 
executive’s set of employment options, and some subset of possible job candidates that are in a 
given subsidiary’s set of potential hires. In other words, the set of counterfactual appointments is 
incomplete, which potentially influences the parameter estimates provided by the matching 
model. 
 
In order for inference to be valid, we have to believe that the attributes of the missing 
counterfactual partners are sufficiently similar to those of the executives and subsidiaries that are 
in the sample. As shown in the descriptive statistics in the next section, the observable 
characteristics of executives, subsidiaries, and the associated MNCs are quite heterogeneous. 
Therefore, the sample participants may in fact accurately represent executives’ and firms’ choice 
sets of potential partners, and not having access to the complete universe of executive–subsidiary 
appointments is perhaps immaterial to the results. 
 
7 Results and discussion 
 
In this section, I summarise key features of the dataset and present the matching patterns 
identified by the maximum score estimator. 
 
7.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 reports the number of executive–subsidiary matches by year and functional role, both 
prior to and following restrictions based on data availability of executive or firm characteristics. 
 
Table 2. Number of executive-subsidiary matches by year and functional role 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 TOTAL 
Total number of matches 256 339 345 378 388 357 2063 
Total number of matches with full information 124 167 182 203 210 182 1068 
of which:        
Monitoring role matches 51 65 80 80 80 77 433 
Implementation role matches 56 74 79 79 108 90 486 
Other 17 28 23 44 22 15 149 
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the raw data on subsidiaries, MNCs, and executives, and 
demonstrates the heterogeneity of firm and individual characteristics in the sample. For example, 
MNCs in the sample range from $2 billion to $3 trillion in assets, and have an international 
presence ranging from five countries to 100 countries worldwide. Some MNCs focus exclusively 
on the CEE region, while for others it represents a minor proportion of global operations. MNC 
subsidiaries range in age from one to 24 years. 76% are acquisitions while the remaining 24% 
are greenfield developments. The executives in the sample have an average of 1.6 educational 
degrees, 83% have experience in the CEE region, 62% are local managers from the subsidiary 
country, and the length of individuals’ tenure with the MNC ranges anywhere from one to 41 
years, with an average of 10 years of firm-specific experience. 
 
  
Table 3. Summary statistics of raw data 
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
MNC assets (in USD billion) 1068 464.0 562.5 2.0 3065.1 
Scope of MNC international operations 1068 23.3 26.3 5 100 
MNC regional presence 1068 0.7 0.3 0.1 1.0 
Subsidiary age 1038 9.8 4.0 1 24 
Subsidiary is an acquisition 1068 0.8 0.4 0 1 
Executive educational attainment 1068 1.6 0.7 1 3 
Executive international experience 1068 64.5 92.6 0 582.8 
Executive regional experience 1068 0.8 0.4 0 1 
Executive nationality matches subsidiary country 1068 0.6 0.5 0 1 
Executive tenure with MNC 1068 10.2 7.2 1 41 
 
Table 4 presents correlations between firm and executive attributes in their CDF forms. The 
pairwise correlation results show that for observed executive–subsidiary partnerships, there is 
very little correlation between the five relationships that I test using the matching model 
(correlations between hypothesised relationships are highlighted in bold). However, pairwise 
correlations between individual attributes of existing partnerships do not inform our 
understanding about the drivers of match formation because simultaneous multi-attribute 
matching occurs within a system and is codetermined by the actions of other players in the 
market. Executives and firms each possess heterogeneous bundles of indivisible traits. Therefore, 
a “perfect” match along all attributes is often not feasible. Instead, executives and firms evaluate 
which attributes are more important for achieving overall job fit for their own individual case, 
and then make the necessary compromises on the remaining attributes. To find out which 
attribute combinations drive executive selection in MNC subsidiaries in the context of an 
interdependent system, we have to examine the estimated parameters provided by the maximum 
score estimator function. 
 
Table 4. Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. MNC assets 1.00          
2. Scope of MNC international operations 0.54 1.00         
3. MNC regional presence –0.38 –0.70 1.00        
4. Subsidiary age 0.15 0.09 0.00 1.00       
5. Subsidiary is an acquisition 0.33 –0.12 –0.02 –0.59 1.00      
6. Executive educational attainment 0.02 0.00 –0.07 0.04 –0.03 1.00     
7. Executive international experience 0.12 0.11 –0.09 0.03 –0.01 0.34 1.00    
8. Executive regional experience –0.01 –0.02 –0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 –0.25 1.00   
9. Executive nationality matches subsidiary country –0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 –0.55 0.57 1.00  
10. Executive tenure MNC 0.19 0.19 –0.18 –0.01 0.13 –0.07 0.27 –0.03 –0.35 1.00 




Executives and MNC subsidiaries match along multiple attributes simultaneously in an effort to 
optimise overall executive–firm fit. To determine which attribute interactions drive the matching 
process, how these patterns change under different economic conditions, and how they differ for 
the two types of functional roles, it was necessary to examine the five matching dimensions 
simultaneously. The maximum score estimator allows for simultaneous estimation of multiple 
parameters. The parameter estimates, which correspond to the cross-partial derivatives of the 
production function, quantify the relationship between executive–firm attributes and allow for 
comparison of the strength of each relationship relative to others in the model. Because the 
variables have been translated to their CDFs, the signs and magnitudes of the parameter 
estimates provide information on the strength of complementarities/substitutions between 
executive–firm attribute pairs. Furthermore, the relative magnitudes of parameter estimates 
reveal which attribute pairs are the strongest determinants of a job match. The point estimates are 
considered significant if the 90% confidence interval does not include zero. 
 
Table 5. Maximum score education 
  Monitoring roles Implementation roles 
Interaction Human capital type 
  
Point 
Est 90% CI 
Point 








Beta2 1.46 (1.12, 1.51) –1.57 (–1.54, 4.85) Scope of MNC international 




Beta3 –3.19 (–3.34, –2.56) –1.93 (–2.73, –4.25) MNC regional presence * 
executive regional experience 
Regional human 
capital 
Beta4 –4.75 (–4.80, –3.81) 1.14 (0.28, 2.31) Subsidiary age * executive 




Beta5 3.90 (3.10, 4.71) 4.82 (3.36, 4.88) Subsidiary is an acquisition * 





 6928  9059    








Beta2 0.39 (–0.92, 0.45) –3.62 (–4.96, 0.35) Scope of MNC international 




Beta3 –1.52 (–1.80, –0.93) –3.84 (–4.48, –3.58) MNC regional presence * 
executive regional experience 
Regional human 
capital 
Beta4 1.43 (1.30, 4.20) 4.59 (3.25, 4.92) Subsidiary age * executive 




Beta5 1.53 (0.51, 1.74) 1.00 (0.93, 1.51) Subsidiary is an acquisition * 





 9534  17456    
% satisfied  57%  56%    
 
7.2.1 Monitoring roles 
 
Table 5 summarises the results of the study. Focusing on results for monitoring roles in the 
subsidiary executive team (which include CEOs, Deputy CEOs, and CFOs), the results show that 
during an economic boom (2005–2007), executive–subsidiary matching is driven by 
complementarities between MNC size and executive education (H1 supported), 
complementarities between scope of international operations and executive international 
experience (H2 supported), substitution between MNC regional presence and executive regional 
experience (H3 unsupported), substitution between subsidiary age and executive national 
experience (H4 unsupported), and complementarity between acquired subsidiaries and executive 
tenure with the MNC (H5 supported). With a parameter value of –4.75, the strongest determinant 
of executive–subsidiary job matching is negative sorting on subsidiary age and executive 
nationality matching the subsidiary country. In other words, the older a subsidiary is, the less 
often it selects executives who are subsidiary-country nationals. The second strongest 
determinant, with a parameter value of 3.90, is acquired subsidiaries selecting longer-tenured 
executives than greenfield subsidiaries. The weakest driver of an executive–subsidiary match is 
complementarity between MNC size and executive education. 
 
Relative to the selection patterns observed during 2005–2007, two major differences arise for 
monitoring roles during an economic crisis (2008–2010), providing support to Hypothesis 6. The 
strongest determinant of executive–subsidiary matching is now complementarity between MNC 
size and executive education (parameter value of 4.45). In contrast to an economic boom, the 
older a subsidiary is, more executives are from the subsidiary country (parameter value of 1.43) 
during an economic downturn. H1, H2, H4, and H5 are supported. H3, which predicts 
complementarity between MNC regional presence and executive regional experience, remains 
unsupported for monitoring roles under both sets of economic conditions. 
 
7.2.2 Implementation roles 
 
Turning to implementation roles (which include COOs, legal executives, and sales executives), 
executive–subsidiary matching is driven by substitution between MNC size and executive 
education (H1 unsupported), substitution between scope of international operations and 
executive international experience (H2 unsupported), substitution between MNC regional 
presence and executive regional experience (H3 unsupported), complementarity between 
subsidiary age and executive national experience (H4 supported), and complementarity between 
acquired subsidiaries and executive tenure with the MNC (H5 supported). These observations 
apply during economic upswings and economic downturns. During an economic upswing, at a 
parameter value of 4.82, the strongest determinant of an executive–subsidiary match is a 
complementary relationship between acquired subsidiaries hiring executives with longer MNC 
tenure. During an economic downturn, at a parameter value of 4.59, the strongest determinant is 
complementarity between subsidiary age and the appointed executive being from the subsidiary 
country. These differences between selection patterns in economic upswings and downturns in 
the implementation role provide further support for Hypothesis 6. 
 
7.2.3 Types of functional roles 
 
The performed analysis revealed a different selection pattern for different functional roles, i.e., 
for monitoring and implementation roles, thus supporting Hypothesis 7. The support was present 
during both types of market conditions. Table 6 summarises the support or lack thereof for all 
seven tested hypotheses. 
 
Table 6. Results of hypothesis testing 
 Economic Upswing Economic Downturn 
 Monitoring Implementation Monitoring Implementation 
H1: A subsidiary executive’s educational 
attainment is complementary to the size of the 
MNC. 
Yes No Yes No 
H2: A subsidiary executive’s international 
experience is complementary to the scope of the 
MNC’s international operations. 
Yes No Yes No 
H3: A subsidiary executive’s relevant regional 
experience is complementary to the MNCs’ 
regional presence in Central and Eastern Europe. 
No No No No 
H4: A local subsidiary executive (a subsidiary-
country national) is complementary to 
subsidiary age. 
No Yes Yes Yes 
H5: A subsidiary executive’s tenure with the 
MNC is complementary to the subsidiary being 
an acquisition. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
H7: The joint preferences of MNCs and 
executives along the above-mentioned attributes 
will differ for monitoring-oriented and 
implementation-oriented functional roles. 
Yes Yes 









H6: The joint preferences of MNCs and 
executives along the above-mentioned attributes 






The results of this study on the determinants of executive–subsidiary matching show that the 
relationship between human capital and the firm’s resource base is largely complementary. 
However, the value of general human capital and firm-specific human capital shifts depending 
on external conditions and depending on the type of functional role appointment. 
 
For monitoring roles (CEOs, Deputy CEOs, CFOs) and implementation roles (COOs, legal 
executives, sales executives) alike, firm-specific human capital dominates educational general 
human capital in match formation during an economic upswing. However, during an economic 
downturn, firm-specific human capital is now a comparatively weak determinant of match 
formation and educational general human capital dominates executive selection, but only for 
monitoring roles. 
 
As such, these results make an important contribution and respond to recent calls for specifying 
the relationship between human capital and firm resources (Mackey et al., 2014). After 
methodologically accounting for selection and labour availability, both firm-specific human 
capital and general human capital function as complementary resources. However, their 
importance for executive selection shifts depending on external circumstances. Firm-specific 
human capital is the dominant determinant of an executive selection during an economic 
upswing for both types of roles, but during an economic downturn firm-specific human capital is 
nearly four times weaker in driving an executive–subsidiary match than general human capital 
(for monitoring roles, parameter values of 1.53 versus 4.45 in bottom left quadrant of Table 5). 
These results corroborate the findings reported in the executive succession literature, which show 
that firms appoint outsider CEOs without firm-specific knowledge following negative shocks 
(Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Guthrie and Datta, 1998). 
 
In examining how the determinants of executive–subsidiary matches differ between monitoring 
roles and implementation roles, the results point to a difference in selection strategies. While 
candidates for monitoring roles are being selected based on complementarities with MNC tenure 
(firm-specific human capital) and international experience (international human capital), 
implementation roles are in contrast being selected on complementarities with national 
experience (country-specific human capital). It is also of note that the advanced hypotheses are 
supported to a greater extent by the data on monitoring roles (H1, H2, H4, and H5), than by the 
data on implementation roles (H4, H5 only) (see Table 6 for a summary). Because many of the 
hypotheses were formulated based on previous research findings, this could indicate that 
executive selection research disproportionately focuses on CEO appointments, and 
comparatively little attention is being paid to selection patterns in the rest of the top management 
team. 
 
Upon examining the relative weights placed on the different types of general human capital 
during the selection process, the results show that broadly relevant general human capital is a 
comparatively weaker determinant of executive–subsidiary matches than general human capital 
that is expressly relevant to subsidiary operations. The absolute magnitude of the parameter on 
country-specific human capital is the largest, followed by regional human capital, international 
human capital, and educational human capital. These matching results suggest that more specific 
types of general human capital offer greater value than broadly applicable general human capital, 
and hold true with one exception. In the case of CEO, Deputy CEO, and CFO appointments 
during economic downturns, education – which is the most broadly applicable human capital – 
trumps all other types of general human capital in determining an executive–subsidiary match. 
These findings have useful implications for the current debate in strategic human capital theory 
about the firm-specific value of general human capital. The results imply that in foreign 
subsidiaries of multinational banks, executive selection is driven by considerations regarding 
relevant country experience more so than by international experience or educational attainment. 
Overall, through the use of an alternative methodological approach (Ryan, 2017), this study has 
extended theory on executive selection and contributed to our understanding of strategic human 
capital. 
 
7.4 Study limitations and future research directions 
 
This study is not without limitations and the presented findings should be considered given the 
empirical context. To begin, this sample of firms is composed of foreign banks in CEE. Focusing 
on a single industry and geographic region limits the generalisability the study’s findings. The 
reporting requirements in this industry and geographic region yielded access to detailed data on 
subsidiary executive team composition, executives’ backgrounds, and firm characteristics at both 
the MNC level and the foreign subsidiary level, which enabled this analysis. However, additional 
research is needed to determine whether these results are valid in other industries, economies, 
and geographies. In particular, it would be useful to examine whether these results also hold for 
emerging market MNCs operating in developed markets. One may expect that when operating in 
developed markets, emerging market MNCs encounter vastly different supply and demand 
curves for executive talent than do developed market MNCs operating in developing countries. 
This warrants further research. 
 
Next, as highlighted earlier, the data included in this study do not represent the universe of 
potential job candidates, nor have I been able to include all potential hiring firms. The set of 
counterfactual appointments is therefore incomplete, which may bias the parameter estimates 
provided by the matching model. I do believe it is reasonable to assume that out-of-sample 
individuals and banks resemble the entities included in my sample. However, an empirical 
design characterised by a closed system would provide greater precision to the estimated 
coefficients. 
 
A meaningful extension of this study would be to use the two-sided matching methodology to 
examine executive team configuration and executive succession. Like executive selection, 
executive team configuration and executive succession are also endogenous, non-random 
processes that are likely to be influenced by unobservable variables. Therefore, using alternative 





Using a unique dataset on subsidiary executive appointments in multinational banks, this study 
investigates two-sided matching in the international labour market. By employing a competitive 
assignment model of executive selection and explicitly accounting for the availability of job 
opportunities and human capital in executives’ and firms’ choice sets, this study addresses the 
endogeneity problem underlying the hiring process. 
 
The international research context is characterised by heterogeneous firms with varied human 
capital needs, allowing for a nuanced examination of the determinants of executive–subsidiary 
matches along multiple human capital dimensions, with a particular emphasis on firm-specific 
versus general human capital. The study explores (i) the determinants of executive selection in 
MNC subsidiaries, (ii) how these determinants shift relative to economic conditions, and (iii) 
how they differ for two types of functional roles. 
 
The data reveal that for monitoring roles, an executive–subsidiary job match is driven by 
complementarities between (i) MNC size and executive education, (ii) scope of international 
operations and executive international experience, and (iii) subsidiary acquisition status and 
executive tenure with the MNC. However, the relative magnitudes of these relationships differ 
between bullish and bearish economic markets. Most markedly, firm-specific knowledge in the 
form of executive tenure is more important for executive selection during an economic upswing 
than during an economic downturn. Conversely, general human capital in the form of education 
dominates executive selection criteria during an economic downturn. 
 
For implementation roles, the matching process appears to be governed by a different set of 
selection mechanisms, the most dominant being complementary relationships between (i) 
subsidiary age and executive nationality matching the subsidiary country, and (ii) subsidiary 
acquisition status and executive tenure with the MNC. 
 
Examining firm-specific human capital and general human capital together enhances our 
understanding of firm hiring behaviour, and allows us to determine the relative value that firms 
place on particular types of human capital under different economic conditions. As such, this 
study contributes to our understanding of the determinants of executive–firm matching, and 
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